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The economic integration of the region reached a turning 
point in early 1984. From that moment on, there has been a 
growing number of initiatives that have given dynamism to 
what was a languishing process. According to the author, 
this new surge towards integration is the region's response 
to a world that seems to be restructuring itself into large 
economic groupings. 
Two stages can be distinguished In this process of 
reactivation: a first stage, which could be described as 
cautious and rather timid, and a second one which began 
with the agreement between Argentina and Brazil in 
mid-1986. This latter stage reflects an intention to speed up 
and deepen economic integration by resorting to new forms 
or to much greater openness at a more rapid pace. 
The signs of openness in the region's economies are 
more and more frequent, to the point where economic 
integration should be seen rather as a derivative of a wider 
attitude that seeks to shift the centre of gravity of 
development policy towards the world market. Indeed, in 
some cases trade was first liberalized with third countries, 
so that what took place with regional integration was only 
an extension of what was taking place with foreign trade 
systems in general. On the other hand, there has been no 
significant progress in fields that are critically Important 
for reintegration, such as payments clearing arrangements 
and balance-of-payments support systems. 
Can indiscriminate opening-up to the international 
economy be reconciled with regional integration? It may be 
assumed that as both processes advance, it will be necessary 
to decide to give priority to one or the other, unless it Is 
possible to find levels of openness and selections of 
activities which make them compatible. The author 
concludes that without a significant margin of preference It 
would be useless to propose the integration of markets, and 
still less the integration of production. 
Selective integration would be easier to reconcile with 
the general trend towards openness. The aspects of the 
integration processes that merit the most attention are the 
most dynamic currents of intraregional trade and the 
development of activities with a high knowledge content 
and those that are critical for progress in the transformation 
of production. 
•Ecuadorian consultant specializing in regional 
integration policies. 
I 
Recollection and homage 
Interest in economic integration has sprung back to 
life in recent years in Latin America. The short-term 
economic situation has continued to be unfavourable, 
but apparently uncertainty about the future and 
awareness of Latin America's diminishing part in the 
world concert were even stronger motives. At first 
sight there is something in common between this 
moment and that time long ago when the first steps 
towards integration in the region took shape: the 
Central American Common Market in 1960 and the 
Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC) in 
1961, both of which were decisively influenced by 
the signing of the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the 
early dynamism of the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Now the impetus is coming from 
a multitude of initiatives, among them once again the 
EEC, with its Single European Act as perhaps the 
most relevant example. 
But there are differences. Towards the end of the 
1950s, the personality of Dr. Raúl Prebisch and the 
ideas of ECLAC inspired a coherent line of 
promotional action with clear objectives. Ultimately, 
however, neither ALALC nor the Central American 
Common Market faithfully followed Prebisch's 
postulates in their articles of association, and this was 
later to prove unfortunate.1 
But neither these discrepancies nor the uneven 
and frustrating experience of these efforts should 
make us forget that the birth of Latin American 
integration was the result of mature reflection about 
the requirements for the sound development of the 
region. A strongly vertebrate Latin America, with all 
its parts closely articulated thanks to integration, was 
the image that Raúl Prebisch insisted on. That is 
what he meant when he spoke of the "globality" of 
regional integration: a term he used to emphasize 
the need for the formula chosen to include all 
Latin American countries, with different treatment 
See Germánico Salgado, "The Latin American regional 
market: the project and the reality", CEPAL Review, No. 7 
(E/CEPA1V1084), Santiago, Chile, April 1979, pp. 85-132. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.II.G.2. 
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according to the situation of each one, but with no 
exclusions nor segmentations, except for Central 
America, where he admitted that for the time 
being a subregional form of integration was called 
for. Never again was the integration of Latin 
America to be posed in such global terms, even 
though ever since clip-service has been paid to that 
old model when people speak of the remote 
objective of a "Latin American common market" or a 
"regional market". 
When the Latin American Economic Conference was 
held in Quito in January 1984, its call for integration 
appeared to be just another tip of the hat to the myth 
of Latin American unity. Normally the admonition 
would very soon have disappeared, leaving no visible 
trace. But this time, apparently, something else 
happened: the Latin American Integration 
Association soon thereafter initiated the regional 
round of negotiations, the Andean Group accelerated 
the preparations for its reform of the Cartagena 
Agreement, and Brazil and Argentina launched in 
record time an Economic Integration and 
Co-operation Programme which was unlike any of the 
usual agreements of this kind. Even in Central 
America, despite the divisions and tensions, a new 
spirit was born with the Esquipulas II Agreement and 
the signing in Guatemala of the treaty establishing the 
Central American Parliament and connected agencies, 
while in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the 
Nassau Consensus of 1984 was a genuine attempt to 
overcome the obstacles to intraregional trade. There 
were many examples of joint actions in the political 
and economic spheres in Latin America: the 
Cartagena Consensus, the Contadora Group, the 
Support Group and later, the Permanent Mechanism 
for Consultation and Policy Co-ordination, also 
known as the Group of Eight. Nor has there been 
£
 United Nations, The Latin American Common 
Market (E/CN.l2/531), Mexico City, 1959, United Nations 
publication, Sales No. 59.II.G.4. 
Today, in a context of enormous instability and 
extreme pressure, Latin America has returned to the 
search for unity. As we have already noted, there is 
no longer a vision of the whole. There have been a 
number of attempts, some bold and imaginative, 
others virtual improvisations, but they all clearly 
contain an element of a makeshift response to a 
difficult and uncertain situation. It is also clear that 
now, more than ever, we need to base our efforts on a 
regional project elaborated by all concerned. 
any lack of decisions designed to make regional 
co-operation a major factor in foreign policy, such as 
Mexico's programme with Central America, the Oil 
Facility of the San José Agreement on Energy 
Co-operation, and the Group of Eight's Acapulco 
Commitment to Peace, Development and Democracy 
in Central America. 
This renewed interest in integration and 
co-operation has continued even more intensely since 
that time, giving rise to still bolder proposals, as we 
will see shortly. 
The Latin American Economic Conference in 
Quito was not, of course, the only cause of this wave 
of initiatives: the region was deeply concerned about 
the future, and this led to a new reappraisal of the 
efforts and initiatives to promote integration and 
solidarity. 
There are many good reasons for this concern. It 
would be hard to imagine a more difficult situation 
for Latin America than the present one. The problem 
of the debt is everywhere, at all levels and all times, 
and other issues in the region which could have much 
more serious consequences in the medium term are 
only just beginning to receive attention. Such issues 
could, for example, make it much more difficult for 
us to eventually overcome our financial straits. This is 
the case of the scientific and technological gap 
displayed by almost all the countries of the region: a 
gap which is steadily growing and already represents 
a tremendous obstacle to our entering the 
international economy on dynamic terms. We have 
lost our proper share in the expansion of world trade, 
especially in exports of manufactures. In relative 
terms, the region is now less important for foreign 
II 
Once again, integration... 
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investment. The already visible symptoms of the 
progressive deterioration of the importance of Latin 
America -and the developing world in general- as a 
source of raw materials are so well known that they 
scarcely need to be mentioned again here. There is a 
clear excess of supply, face to face with a level of 
demand which tends to grow only at a snail's pace 
because, inter alia, production increasingly demands 
more knowledge and information and less natural 
resources. The prospects are no better for producers 
of industrial goods, whether these are barely-
processed raw materials or medium-technology 
exports. In both cases the protectionism of the big 
markets places prohibitive limits on the possibilities 
of expansion. 
And this is only one side of the economic 
constraints that the region has been unable to 
overcome. If we add to it the economic instability of 
almost all the countries of the region, the traumatic 
alternatives of adjustment policies, and stagnating 
production with its consequent high unemployment, 
we have a partial explanation for the growing 
demoralization of the more educated elements of the 
population, especially young people. The lamentable 
period of boundless political repression in the 1970s 
has left open wounds in many countries. On top of 
that, we are now in a period of constant constraints, 
bordering on chaos in some countries. Not 
surprisingly, their best-trained citizens are once again 
beginning to migrate to the rich countries. Before, the 
reason was repression or violence; now it is 
unemployment, uncertainty and the almost total lack 
of horizons. 
Naturally, the problems are not this extreme 
throughout the entire region, and in some countries 
the prospects may even be quite encouraging. The 
vast majority of the population of the region, 
however, is living in a truly difficult situation, and 
moreover has been doing so for more than a decade. 
For that majority, the brief reference we have made to 
their hardships is neither tendentious nor exaggerated. 
It is true that there are positive facts to put on the 
other side of the scale, such as the spread of 
democratic political forms, which are undoubtedly an 
asset. But, at the same time, we also cannot forget 
that many countries of the region have suffered or 
still suffer from scourges like political violence or 
drug trafficking. 
I have pinted this scene in strong colours because 
I believe that we must seek the explanation for much 
of what is happening now in Latin America in the 
marks these difficulties and problems have left on the 
typical Latin American, be he simple citizen or 
political leader. When facing the rest of the world, 
and especially the industrialized world, Latin 
Americans feel like persons in desperate straits, who, 
moreover, have lost the solidarity of all the other poor 
countries. In spite of some recent signs of attention by 
the United States, Latin Americans perceive that the 
region's problems are steadüy losing importance for 
that country and the other rich countries. The best 
symbol of this attitude is the title of a book recently 
published in Colombia which sums up the results of a 
seminar. The book is entitled América Latina se ha 
quedado sola (Latin America has been left on its 
own), and despite its somewhat dramatic tone it 
reflects a state of feeling which explains certain 
special features of the situation, as we shall see 
below. 
One of these features is this rebirth of the 
motivation for integration, after this, ideal had 
vegetated for decades, except in the mind's of a few 
highly motivated people, at a time when the 
circumstances -especially the degree of macro-
economic imbalance affecting almost all the 
countries- make it particularly difficult to embark on 
such a difficult enterprise. This interest in integration 
has clearly returned not only because of the logical 
need for joint action or bigger scales of production, 
but also because of the example of the more powerful 
countries, which have already organized themselves 
into integrated blocs or are in the process of doing so. 
A look at the international economy during these 
years clearly shows effects of the tension of intense 
competition -today, without a doubt, even stronger 
than political rivalry, which is diminishing- so it is 
natural to unite in order to gain increased power. 
Jacques Delors, one of those responsible for the 
impact caused by the Single European Act, openly 
expresses this motivation when he states that the 
signatories of the Act are competing in a worldwide 
race where the stakes are economic survival and, 
ultimately, the capacity for expression and political 
action.4 
Alvaro Tirado Mejía, et al., América Latina se ha 
quedado sola, Bogotá, Santularia, 1989. 
Paolo Cecchini, foreword to Europa 1992: una 
apuesta de futuro, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1988, p. 9. 
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That is the view of a European who, as we 
mentioned, was the driving force behind the Single 
European Act. According to this same Act, by the end 
of 1992 the internal market of the Europe of the 
Twelve will have been established as, "a space with 
no internal frontiers, in which the free circulation of 
merchandise, persons, services and capital will be 
guaranteed...". 
The concern that the Single European Act signed 
in 1986 would lead to a "fortress Europe", closed and 
protected, was probably one of the reasons that led 
the United States to sign a Free Trade Agreement 
with Canada in 1988. 
That concern and the evident preoccupation of 
the United States about the hitherto unstoppable 
advance of Japan as an exporter of high-technology 
products also explain the recent negotiations with 
Mexico to constitute some kind of free-trade area. 
There was talk that the United States was interested in 
incorporating Latin America into a similar 
arrangement, but President Bush's recent proposal to 
extend the free-trade area to all of the Americas 
-North, Central and South- was a real surprise. His 
intention is clear. President Bush was proposing in 
effect to initiate a process of creating a free-trade 
area for the whole hemisphere, from Anchorage to 
Tierra del Fuego.6 This goes back, in very different 
circumstances, to an invitation already made to Latin 
America during the last century by Secretary of State 
Blaine. 
Single European Act", art. 13, Ibero-American 
Co-operatfon Institute (ICI) and Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Pensamiento 
Iberoamericano, No. 15, January-June 1989. 
* Text of Ibe speech given on 27 June in Washington, D.C. 
Japan, for its part, has the Pacific Basin as a 
space in which to progressively build up a bloc of 
countries with itself as nucleus. Without resorting to 
any formal integration model, Japan already has close 
economic relations with the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which, though it 
too has no formal integration structure, nevertheless 
functions for all practical purposes as if it did have 
one. Japan also looks beyond to the great 
amphitheater which is the vital sphere of its business 
activities, congregated today in the Pacific Economic 
Co-operation Conference. 
The dizzy changes seen in recent months also 
raise dramatic questions about the future evolution 
of the EEC. The reunification of Germany will 
mean the incorporation of the German Democratic 
Republic, and the EEC is expected to establish some 
kind of relationship with the other Eastern-bloc 
countries too, especially Hungary, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. 
Thus, as it emerges from the turbulent 1980s, the 
world is made up of groups of States -blocs is a better 
word to express their growing cohesion- gathered 
around the United States, Western Europe, the 
Soviet Union as it emerges from "perestroika", and 
Japan. China and India are currently hovering 
discreetly in the background, but no projection into 
the future can forget that they will have a decisive 
place on the international stage, with their billions 
of inhabitants. 
Clearly, a fragmented Latin America can only 
look forward to a subordinate and passive fate in such 
a world. What is happening with this new drive 
towards integration is above all a response from Latin 
America to a world which is marching inexorably 
towards large groupings of States, either as common 
markets or, as is also probable in some cases, 
associations of States of a federal or confederational 
character. 
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III 
The two phases of reactivation 
What has happened with regard to the integration of 
Latin America in recent years is truly disconcerting. 
The process that we have described as a rebirth of 
integration consists in reality of two quite different 
phases. The first of these was a lukewarm revival, in 
which an attempt was made to save the existing 
efforts (basically ALADI, the Andean Group and 
CARICOM) from stagnation or regression. During 
this time, the Central American Common Market was 
suffering the consequences of its armed conflicts and 
little could be done to motivate it. It was kept 
formally alive, however, and that in itself was no 
small accomplishment. As for the other three 
groupings, ALADI initiated in this period the regional 
round of negotiations, the reform of the Cartagena 
Agreement was gradually defined and negotiated, and 
the Nassau Consensus was worked out at a meeting of 
the Conference of the Heads of Government of the 
Caribbean Community, held in 1984. ALADI began 
its regional round of negotiations in 1985 and ended 
the preparatory phase in 1987, which was also the 
year in which the Quito Protocol reforming the 
Cartagena Agreement was signed. Thus, this first 
stage of cautious and rather timid reactivation runs 
from 1984 to 1987. 
The second stage -a radical break from the 
previous inertia- is characterized by the will to 
accelerate and deepen economic integration by 
resorting either to different formulas or simply to 
greater mutual openness and more rapid action. The 
Programme for Economic Integration and Co-
operation between Argentina and Brazil certainly 
belongs to this kind of initiative. It was signed in 
mid-1986, chronologically towards the end of what 
we termed the first stage, but because of its selective 
character, which distinguishes it from the usual 
integration formulas, and its patent audacity, it merits 
being singled out as part of this more innovative 
stage. Uruguay associated itself with the programme, 
albeit still in general terms, under the 1988 Alvorada 
agreement.7 
More typical of this second stage are the recent 
initiatives that have modified, at least formally, 
the integration efforts previously mentioned. 
Chronologically, the first of these initiatives is the 
Treaty on Integration, Co-operation and Development 
between the Argentine Republic and the Federative 
Republic of Brazil (signed in November 1988), 
according to which the two countries undertake to 
establish a general free-trade area within 10 years. 
Next comes the approval of the Strategic Design for 
the Orientation of the Andean Group contained in the 
Galápagos Declaration adopted at the Summit 
Meeting of the Andean Presidents in December 1989. 
In comparison with the stipulations of the Quito 
Protocol or the Protocol Modifying the Cartagena 
Agreement, signed in 1987, this Strategic Design 
speeds up considerably the constitution of a customs 
union and also calls for the rapid revision of industrial 
programmes and another series of steps which must 
also be taken well before the Protocol goes into 
effect. This initiative, which signifies a radical 
acceleration of Andean integration, was preceded by 
the agreements to intensify trade relations between 
Venezuela and Colombia, and between these 
countries and Mexico, Central America and the 
Caribbean. Also, in December 1989, ALADI took 
initiatives to widen the scope of certain instruments 
and speed up the regional round of negotiations. This 
new attitude resulted in the approval in June 1990 of 
the regional agreement which substantially reinforces 
the Regional Tariff Preference (RTP). 
n 
The forms of association will be progressively 
established later. For the time being, three protocols have 
been signed in this regard. 
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IV 
The moment of caution 
The contrast between the two phases could not be 
stronger. The first fully merits Juan Mario Vacchino's 
characterization of the spirit of the action pursued at 
that time, namely " . . . to begin a new phase, more 
operative, pragmatic and adapted to the conditions of 
an international scenario whose long-term profile is 
not easy to establish with any precision".8 Clearly, it 
was not sought to make revolutionary changes in the 
integration schemes, and in the best of cases the aim 
was to get them working again and thus overcome 
their stagnation. 
As we already mentioned, the regional round of 
negotiations of ALADI corresponded to this kind of 
initiative. It took exactly two years to move from the 
resolution of the Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs in March 1985 to the adoption of the 
programme to establish a regional system for trade 
and payments (March, 1987), and in reality, the 
concrete results of the round are still meager. The 
programme put into effect in March 1987 included 
several specific actions: reinforcing the Regional 
Tariff Preference (RTP), the Regional Agreement for 
the Recovery and Expansion of Trade, the 
commitment to dismantle tariff restrictions, and the 
creation of a mechanism to offset trade imbalances. 
As we can see, the scheduled content of the 
regional round of negotiations is symptomatic of a 
more open and decisive attitude towards the 
intensification of regional trade than the approach 
taken up till then in ALALC and later in ALADI. 
However, the initial negotiations were entered upon 
with reservations, and the results did not come up to 
expectations. 
In the Regional Tariff Preference -the Latin 
American preference that received so much attention 
when the ALADI treaty was negotiated- a basic 
preference of 10% was agreed for countries of the 
same class, while the maximum preference reached 
22% for the landlocked countries. These are useful 
concessions, but not enough to bring about 
noticeable changes in trade. 
See Juan Mario Vacchlno, "Esquemas latinoamericanos de 
integración. Problemas y desarrollo", Pensamienlo Iberoamericano, 
No. 15, Madrid, ICI/ECLAC, January-June, 1989, p. 69. 
In its early decisions, the Regional Agreement 
for the Recovery and Expansion of Trade formulated 
the ambitious goal of diverting towards the region 
30% of imports from third countries, with basic 
preferences of around 60%. These initial aspirations 
were considerably reduced in the course of the 
negotiations, especially in the case of those relating to 
the percentages of diversion of trade with third 
parties, which finally stood at amounts varying from 
2% to 20%, according to the class of country: 
certainly far below the 30% originally planned. 
The rest of the elements of the agreement were in 
serious danger of becoming a dead letter. The 
elimination of non-tariff restrictions did not seem 
feasible for some countries that depended on those 
instruments to defend themselves from balance-
of-payments problems, and moreover the agreement 
included a multitude of exceptions which reduced its 
effectiveness. Apart from progressing on some 
general definitions, very little has been done to 
implement the mechanism for lessening the impact of 
imbalances in regional trade, and still less has been 
done to put into effect balance-of-payments support 
mechanisms or systems for regulating State 
purchases: two issues included in the regional round 
of negotiations because of their critical importance 
for regional integration. 
In ALADI, the most dynamic elements have 
continued to be the limited-scope agreements, while 
the complementation agreements could also become a 
dynamic element in the future. By way of example, 
we could cite the agreements that link Uruguay with 
Argentina, and Brazil with Mexico; those that 
incorporate the matters negotiated in the integration 
treaty between Argentina and Brazil; the comple-
mentation agreements between Argentina and 
Colombia and between Colombia and Peru, and those 
recently drawn up between Colombia and Venezuela. 
Unfortunately, there has been no progress in 
establishing systems which would allow for 
converging limited-scope actions into global multi-
lateral action. If multilateral instruments like the 
Regional Agreement for the Recovery and Expansion 
of Trade and the Regional Tariff Preference have no 
decisive effect on trade, then there would be a need 
for quantitatively significant preferences applicable to 
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a wide sphere of trade, that is to say, not limited by 
the mass of current exceptions, and ALADI would 
most probably become in the future a system of 
integration in which different velocities would 
coexist, with all the difficulties one could expect from 
such a complex network of bilateral relations. 
As we will see later, the multilateral instruments 
could possibly become more important and the 
system could work more dynamically than in the past. 
That, at least, is the dominant tone today, in clear 
contrast with a recent past in which a cautious 
stinginess prevailed, particularly in the larger 
countries. 
In spite of all these limitations, trade within 
ALADI grew in 1988 and 1989, the preliminary 
figure for total intraregional exports in the latter year 
being US$10 238 million: 10.5% more than in 1988, 
when the value of intraregional exports had grown by 
12.5% in relation to 1987, thus indicating a more or 
less steady recovery from the extremely low figure of 
US$7 016 million recorded in 1983. Brazil and 
Argentina provided more than half of these exports in 
1988 (56.3%), and a good part of the growth is 
explained by the increased trade between these two 
countries. The sources of trade imbalances between 
the members continued to be the same, and in 1988 
Brazil continued to achieve positive trade balances 
(more than US$1.9 billion by the end of the year). 
In the present situation, the Protocol Modifying 
the Cartagena Agreement, or the Quito Protocol, now 
has an almost purely historical value, since it has been 
basically replaced by the Strategic Design as 
approved at the Galápagos Meeting. At all events, it 
is worth briefly examining the features of the reform 
made in 1987, since it offers an interesting contrast 
with the attitudes in vogue today. 
The reform of the Cartagena Agreement as made 
in the Quito Protocol of May 1987, corrected an 
economic integration model which incorporated the 
technical concepts of integration common in Latin 
America after a decade of experience with ALALC 
and the Central American Common Market. With its 
emphasis on selective industrial programming, it 
further developed the old formulations of Prebisch 
and ECLAC which it had not been able to bring to 
fruition in ALALC nor in the Central American 
Common Market. The Cartagena Agreement was for 
that same reason the prototype of an integration 
system designed to support a policy of import 
substitution: in no way did it exclude the expansion of 
exports to the rest of the world, but that was not an 
explicit objective either, since the first goal of the 
integration process was precisely to build a larger 
domestic market. 
The defects that prevented the Cartagena 
Agreement from fulfilling its goals have been widely 
studied, and this is not the place to recall them. 
Suffice it to point out that, formally, the Andean 
Group had to reform its statutes once it became clear 
that it was impossible to approve a common external 
tariff and arrive at a customs union, as called for by 
the Cartagena Agreement. The reform process that 
culminated in the Quito Protocol, that is to say, the 
Protocol Modifying the Cartagena Agreement, began 
at that time, and the preparation and negotiation of 
the reform went on for years. The final product, the 
Quito Protocol reformed the Cartagena Agreement in 
the following ways: i) it reduced the original demands 
regarding deadlines, leaving some open, like the one 
for adopting a common external tariff; it also allowed 
for restrictive systems, such as managed trade, which 
in fact limited the sphere of the liberalization 
programme; ii) several of its stipulations (especially 
complementation agreements between two or more 
countries and lists of trade managed by the countries) 
allow for bilateral arrangements which (as occurred in 
ALADI) broke the unity of the multilateral system of 
the original agreement; iii) industrial programming 
lost the central character it had in the Cartagena 
Agreement; the Quito Protocol maintained several 
forms of industrial programming, but it was evident 
that its use would be very limited and not very 
effective, especially as there was a tendency -soon 
becoming a virtual rule- not to assign industries to 
certain countries. 
The Quito Protocol did, however, have the merit 
of breaking a years-old impasse, which had affected 
the credibility of the Agreement and had led to 
multiple failures to comply with its stipulations. The 
Cartagena Agreement assumed a more clearly 
commercial character than before and suffered the 
weakening of its basic compensation instrument 
-industrial programming- which was supposed to 
9
 The open-economy currents which were beginning at that 
lime (the second half of the 1970s) in Latin America and within the 
Andean Group partially explain the impossibility of reaching 
agreements about the level of tariffs. 
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ensure an equitable distribution of the benefits of 
integration. But its agencies were able to function 
normally and use the Agreement's renewed juridical 
validity to reduce non-compliance with and violations 
of its stipulations. 
This did indeed happen, but the application of the 
managed-trade lists and escape clauses, as was 
predictable, were serious obstacles to the recovery of 
trade. Intraregional exports increased strongly in 1987 
(from US$662 million in 1986 to US$1 054 million 
in 1987), but then dropped slightly to remain almost 
stationary in 1988 and 1989 (US$974 million and 
US$957 million, respectively). 
This disconcerting stage of radical change is, in my 
view, the result of various circumstances facing the 
region today to an extent that, while no longer 
surprising, is nevertheless undoubtedly unusual. 
Sacrificing nuances and shades of meaning for the 
sake of clarity, these circumstances are the following: 
i) The perception of a loss of solvency, 
influence and prestige in the international sphere, 
with its inevitable consequence of a deterioration in 
bargaining power. One element in this perception is 
the consciousness of the growing lag in the 
development of activities involving the technological 
innovation characteristic of modern societies, which 
are being rapidly transformed by that same 
innovation and other forces. 
ii) The awareness that the overwhelming 
internationalization of economic life calls for the 
rethinking of the economic-policy schemes with 
which the region has functioned up till now and for 
the adoption of the scheme (or schemes) most suitable 
for taking advantage of the most dynamic currents in 
the world economy, assimilating the new 
technologies, and endogenously generating a capacity 
for innovation and management of production. Such 
awareness of the outworn nature of the present 
structures and of the inevitability of having to take an 
active part in the international economy in order to 
take advantage of its drive, with all the risks that 
might bring, forms the mental background to the 
positions of the so-called "openness" which prevails 
today in the region, with a whole gamut of critical 
and acritical variants. 
It was clear that unless the managed-trade lists 
were suppressed, or at least reformed, it was 
impossible to reactivate Andean integration. That 
issue, however, like the revision of the industrial 
programmes which had been approved in the 1970s, 
was conflictive and urgently needed to be reformed 
for technical reasons. It was evident towards the end 
of the 1980s that the Protocol had put off the solution 
to some fundamental problems -among them, the 
very definition of the real objectives of the integration 
formula- while it had created other problems that 
required an urgent solution, such as the case of 
managed trade, mentioned above. 
iii) The influence exercised (or the conditions 
imposed) by the centres of the world economy to 
obtain that "openness" -as fully and quickly as 
possible- as a prerequisite for arriving at solutions to 
the pressing financial problems affecting the region 
today. It is no secret that the governments of the 
United States and the other creditor countries, either 
directly or through the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), impose "policy 
reforms" or "structural adjustment" as a condition for 
initiating negotiations in connection with the Brady 
Plan: the possibility of renegotiations that may loosen 
the hangman's knot of the external debt is certainly a 
powerfully effective lure. 
iv) The consciousness of a common identity 
among the people of Latin America, which has 
grown stronger with recent events, in which many 
analogies and affinities are perceived, especially the 
restoration of democratic institutions in the nations 
that were under dictatorial governments during the 
1960s and 1970s. Painful experiences lived in 
common, such as the constraints created by the 
external debt, have also contributed to this growing 
closeness. For these reasons, this seems to be a 
circumstance that particularly favours the political 
motivation of co-operation and co-ordination among 
Latin American States. Unfortunately, however, 
the balance-of-payments constraints and instability 
typical of this time of hardship in the region 
create conditions that militate against the con-
tinuity needed for successful economic integration 
policies. 
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v) The awareness that an important feature of 
the period we are entering is the regrouping of forces 
on the international level in order to compete with the 
maximum impact and autonomy in the worldwide 
race to which Delors referred in the quotation cited 
above. This race could be a test of the nations' 
capacity to compete and will, in any case, be a 
confrontation of economic powers for which the 
countries' need to prepare themselves by joining 
forces and capacities through economic and, if 
necessary, political integration is increasingly 
evident. Something much more important than the 
possibility of competing depends on this preparation. 
Paraphrasing Delors, we could say that "economic 
survival" is at stake, and even "the capacity of 
expression and political action", that is to say, 
sovereignty. 
It seems to me that these perceptions and 
concerns have a place in the collective consciousness 
that spawns new and novel economic and political 
ideas, which are rapidly gaining support and even 
Midway between these two phases, and with only a 
brief gestation period, came the Argentine-Brazilian 
Integration Agreement signed in July 1986: the first 
step in one of the most original initiatives for Latin 
American integration. At least for those not involved 
in its creation, this Agreement came as a surprise 
which aroused sudden interest in the integration of the 
region. The novelty and audacity of the formula, 
which broke with all the traditional schemes imposed 
by the classical integration theory and by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), were in 
themselves sufficient cause for the expectations to 
which it gave rise. But its main effect was the shock it 
gave to the structure of political and economic 
relations which had immobilized the region, and 
especially South America, for many years. The way 
ALALC (later ALADI) functioned was one of the 
manifestations of this immobility. If the triangle 
formed by Argentina, Brazil and Mexico had wanted 
to, it could have imparted dynamism to trade and the 
integration of production throughout the region. The 
widespread popularity in the region. The concept of 
"openness" has this characteristic, insofar as it is seen 
as a way of securing insertion into the international 
economy. The liberal concepts that insist on a 
reduced and subsidiary State enjoy similar 
acceptance. Beyond ideologies, political solidarity 
and co-operation (and their concrete expressions in 
joint action) have also gained new esteem on the basis 
of this background of collective feelings. The 
desirability of integration has once again come to 
occupy a leading place, and that may explain this 
phase of bold, rapid decisions regarding integration 
policies, in contrast with the slower and more 
cautious approach of the past. We should not, 
however, overlook the serious difficulties that these 
policies will have to face as long as the financial 
crisis continues and unless something is done to 
dispel the contradictions to which we could be 
exposed if greater openness to the world economy is 
not reconciled with integration in the region. This last 
point is the basic concern of the rest of this article. 
Argentine-Brazilian Agreement was a radical change 
which could mean a break with ALADI or an 
injection of vitality. The action of the two countries 
soon proved that the latter would be the case, if 
other countries took up the challenge. The upheaval 
in the old geopolitical concepts was even more patent. 
Several of the traditional pillars of the relations 
between Latin American countries were swept away. 
A powerful Atlantic axis surfaced which called for a 
complete rethinking of foreign policy and economic 
integration. The Andean Group11 suddenly found 
luThc Protocol on the Expansion of Trade and the Protocol 
on Capital Goods were incorporated into the Latin American 
Integration Association (ALADI) as a Partial-Scope Agreement and 
as a Complementarity Agreement, respectively. Uruguay has joined 
this integration through tripartite decisions. 
11
 See Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, "El proceso de integración 
argentino-brasileña y sus repercusiones en el Pacto Andino. Un 
esquema general de concertación", Lima, 1986 p. 15, mtmeo. 
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itself corralled in the northern part of South America, 
with Venezuela gravitating towards Brazil and 
Argentina.12 Mexico itself, displaced from its 
relation with the two other large countries of the 
region, must have felt that it was losing its place in 
the South and that this was pushing it perilously 
towards its neighbour to the north, which in turn 
made no secret of its interest in establishing a special 
trade relationship with Mexico. 
However, the economic situation of Argentina 
and Brazil was not exactly propitious for in-depth 
integration, even if it were selective. The 
Governments of Alfonsin and Samey -the first 
democratic and civilian régimes after long years 
of military governments- were going through the 
worst moments of tremendously difficult stabilization 
and adjustment policies. The circumstances at the 
time, and what happened afterwards, indicate that 
the motivation was primarily political: one of the 
first signs of that new spirit, born of frustrating 
experiences but also of solidarity, which we have 
tried to describe in the section above. 
The formula or model followed by the Economic 
Integration and Co-operation Programme between 
Argentina and Brazil has been widely described, so 
there is no need for us to do so again here. The main 
point is that it is a selective action of integration and 
co-operation, concentrating on specific tasks 
considered by the two countries to be of priority 
importance. According to the available information, 
24 protocols have been signed so far, each one 
dealing with one of those tasks. Protocol No. 1 
concerns capital goods; the last one, Protocol No. 24, 
refers to economic and social planning. These two are 
good examples of the character of this enterprise: the 
objective of the Protocol on Capital Goods is to reach 
a kind of common market for this sector, even 
involving commitments regarding State purchases. 
Protocol No. 24, on economic and social planning, 
creates machinery for consultation and co-ordination 
of macroeconomic policies between the two 
countries. The other protocols contain a series of 
12
 Hello Jaguarlbe, "La integración Argentina-Brasil", 
Integración Latinoamericana, No. 129, Buenos Aires, Institute 
for Latin American Integration, November 1987, p. 6. 
initiatives for integration or co-operation in fields 
as varied as food supply, scientific research 
(biotechnology) and cultural integration. 
In its four years of operation, the Programme 
has produced positive results, especially if we 
consider the difficulties of keeping this kind of 
relation alive during such an unstable period in the 
two countries. 
Bilateral trade grew substantially from 1986 
onwards, and the increase in Brazilian exports since 
1987 has been particularly noteworthy. Argentina 
persistently tends to run overall deficits (US$463 
million in 1988), but trade in capital goods under 
Protocol No. 1 -the one of greatest interest to both 
countries- is in balance. Argentina's exports of 
capital goods to Brazil trebled between 1986 and 
1988, rising from US$17.7 million to US$51.4 
million, and this increase is entirely attributable to 
exports of goods on the Common List of that 
Protocol. Brazilian exports also increased in absolute 
terms (from US$45 million to US$83 million during 
the same period). The deficit in capital-goods trade 
thus decreased noticeably, and if we only consider 
products on the Common List of capital goods, 
Argentina ended 1988 with a slight surplus (US$2.5 
million). The Protocol has effectively stimulated 
trade in capital goods, even though the figures did not 
reach the goals established, which were patently 
over-ambitious.13 
The same protocol made it possible to take 
advantage of part of the potential demand for capital 
goods in both countries, although for the time being 
without any significant changes in investments or the 
structure of supply. Porta and Fontanals conclude 
that, at least for Argentina, there have been no 
dynamic effects in the sector,1 with the possible 
exception of the sub-branches of machine tools and 
packaging equipment. The cause of this lack of 
dynamism would appear to lie in the aftermath of 
Argentina's recent industrial history, characterized by 
declines in production and employment, the 
persistence of recessive adjustment policies, and 
policies that run counter to the attempts to open up 
Fernando Porta and Jorge Fontanals, "La integración 
intraindustrial: el caso del Acuerdo Argentino-Brasileño en el 
sector de bienes de capital", Integración Latinoamericana, 
No. 152, Buenos Aires, Institute for Latín American Integration 
(INTAL), December 1989, p. 19. 
1 4 /èW. ) P .22. 
LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION AND EXTERNAL OPENNESS {G. Salgado 145 
the country to capital-goods imports from third 
countries. Other elements within the framework of 
the same formula have not functioned efficiently 
either: the product-by-product method of negotiation 
impedes strategies for complementarity; barely any 
progress has been made in public-sector purchases, 
and there have been delays in the execution of the 
protocols on the Investment Fund and the Statute on 
Binational Enterprises, which could have been 
decisive in stimulating the restructuring of production 
in the capital-goods sector. 
It is not known what stage has been reached by 
the Argentine-Brazilian programme at the present 
time (July 1990). The harsh adjustment policies 
applied in both countries and the brutal contraction 
they produced must have provoked a real paralysis of 
trade. If these efforts are successful, bilateral trade 
could begin to expand again and a dynamic 
restructuring process could be gradually put into 
effect to allow for complementarity between the two 
countries. This would call for an active and coherent 
industrial policy, under the leadership of the State. 
Without such a policy, the possibilities offered by this 
integration will soon be exhausted, with very little 
effect for both countries. 
Both countries undoubtedly are vitally interested 
in continuing their integration efforts, as 
demonstrated by recent decisions which will be 
discussed later. It is true that the gradual and selective 
approach taken by this formula has its limits, and it 
might soon be necessary to broaden the field of 
integration. The interesting thing to note, however, 
is that this formula, despite the adverse economic 
situation, has served and is still serving as a starting 
point. It is very doubtful that a comprehensive 
across-the-board system would have been viable in 
the conditions prevailing at the time. In contrast, with 
a formula of selective integration, balanced (by 
specific areas and not intrasectorally) and applied 
15
 ibid., p. 24. 
ïf,lbid., p. 26. 
17
 Basically because of lhe difficulties in harmonizing 
comprehensive policies with the attempt to limit them to one 
sector. See D. Chudnovsky and F. Porta, "On Argentine-Brazilian 
economic integration", CEPAL Review, No. 39 (LC/G.1583-P), 
Santiago, Chile, December 1989. 
in a graduated, flexible and progressiv manner, 
it has been possible at least to begin to intensify 
integration in the higher-priority sectors. It may be 
noted in passing that this description recalls the theses 
of ECLAC in the 1950s, when Raúl Prebisch 
spoke of gradual, balanced (reciprocal) and selective 
integration. 
As if to bow to the criticisms previously levelled 
at limited sectoral integration, in November 1988 
Argentina and Brazil signed a Treaty on Integration, 
Co-operation and Development which seems a 
throwback to the orthodox integration model. The 
objective is to first establish a customs union and then 
a common market. With a conciseness that is not 
usually found in Latin American integration 
instruments,19 this treaty provides for broad tariff 
and non-tariff liberalization of trade in goods and 
services over a period of 10 years. The proposal is 
ambitious, especially because of it includes services, 
but negotiating product-by-product could turn out to 
be a slow and cumbersome process. The common 
market would come into effect in the second stage, 
once the necessary harmonization of policies had 
been accomplished. The Treaty is so vague, however, 
that its real content remains to be defined. It is an 
interesting gesture on the part of the two countries, 
but not much more than that. In reality, the 24 
protocols of what is now the "old" pact will continue 
to be the basis of this binational integration process. 
The treaty is also extremely laconic about institutions; 
it only states that it will be directed and administered 
by an intergovernmental body, without mentioning a 
secretariat. This is one more manifestation of the 
traditional aversion of both countries, and especially 
of Brazil, to anything that sounds like 
supranationality. 
Argentina ratified the treaty on 23 August 
1989, but apparently there has not yet been any 
attempt to put it into effect. One can understand the 
Juan Mano Vacchino, "EI programa de integración 
argentino-brasileña y las relaciones de América Latina y Europa. 
Reflexiones complementarias", Integración Latinoamericana, 
No. 133, Buenos Aires, Institute for Latin American Integration 
(INTAL), April 1988, p. 59. 
And much more concise than the Treaty of Rome, which in 
Latin America would be taken to be overly regulatory, without 
being so. 
20 
By the Government of Menem. It was signed during 
(he Government of Alfonsfn. It is not yet known whether Brazil has 
ratified the treaty or not. 
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reasons for both countries trying to introduce a broad 
integration programme, but in view of the 
complexities of their economic situation, it is hard to 
see how it could be implemented any time soon and 
contribute to reactivating both economies. 
At all events» it marks a trend which quickly 
made its appearance elsewhere in the region. Thus, 
for example, in the final declaration (known as the lea 
Declaration) of the Third Presidential Meeting of the 
Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Policy 
Co-ordination (the Group of Eight), held on 11-12 
October 1989 in lea, Peru, special attention was paid 
to the question of integration and the problem of the 
external debt. In the Communiqué which ends the 
declaration, the Ministers of Foreign Relations, 
Economics and Finance, and Planning of the Group 
of Eight were instructed to meet soon thereafter, in 
December 1989, to examine a series of concrete 
issues relating to integration which had been raised 
by the Presidents: the replacement of quantitative 
restrictions with tariffs, projected complementarity 
agreements, etc 
The group of Ministers met on 4-5 December 
1989 in Argentina, where they issued the Buenos 
Aires Declaration. This is a relatively brief document, 
but replete with initiatives for reactivating integration, 
especially within the framework of ALADI. It sets 
out four basic lines, namely: 
i) the elimination of non-tariff restrictions on 
reciprocal trade; 
ii) the broadening and further development of the 
regional tariff preference (PAR) to cover all 
products; 
iii) the broadening and further development of 
bilateral agreements; 
v) the lowering of the tariff levels applied in 
reciprocal trade, through successive rounds of 
trade negotiations. 
The Declaration lays down specific tasks in 
respect of each of these points, some with obligatory 
deadlines. These decisions were to be presented at the 
Fifth Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of ALADI, held in Mexico City at the end of 
April 1990. One of the points on the agenda of this 
meeting concerned concrete measures for intensifying 
the integration process in the areas of trade, 
transportation, and economic complementarity. Of 
these, trade was the issue that aroused the most 
interest. The Buenos Aires Declaration had been 
specific on some trade policy measures, particularly 
the further development of the regional tariff 
preference, both with respect to levels (a 50% 
increase) as well as the number of exceptions 
allowed (reduction by 10%). Because of last-minute 
difficulties in the negotiations, which we will mention 
later, the Mexico City meeting was unable to arrive at 
decisions on these issues. It did take decisions on 
some other points of interest (the inapplicability of 
non-tariff restrictions in the list of market openings; 
elimination of non-tariff restrictions in limited-scope 
agreements, when such elimination had been accepted 
in those agreements; a regional programme of 
economic complementarity and technological co-
operation applied to production, etc.), but none of 
them had the political importance of the issues 
affecting the Regional Tariff Preference. Finally, on 
20 June, more than a month and a half later, the 
second protocol modifying the regional agreement 
(No. 4) establishing the Regional Tariff Preference, 
was signed in Montevideo. This Protocol increases 
the levels of the preference by far more than the 
recommended 50%. Thus, the basic preference went 
up from 10% to 20% and the maximum level (in 
favour of landlocked countries) rose from 22% to 
48%. It was agreed that non-tariff restrictions would 
not be applied to products covered by the Regional 
Tariff Preference and the exceptions to this 
Preference were significantly reduced (by more than 
the 10% recommended by the Buenos Aires 
Declaration). 
These latter decisions, which far surpass the 
terms of the Buenos Aires Declaration, faithfully 
represent the new spirit of Latin American 
integration. If the tariff level for third countries 
is not very low, even the basic preference of 20% (for 
countries in the same class) would be an interesting 
stimulus for the expansion of intraregional trade. No 
important progress was made on the other issues. 
Unfortunately, the status quo was maintained for 
some of them (financing of payments and trade), but, 
perhaps quite rightly, the Regional Tariff Preference 
-a multilateral instrument- was chosen to express 
the disposition towards openness and solidarity 
which characterizes integration at this time. 
Another result, partially due to the influence of 
the Group of Eight is the change which seems to have 
taken place in the Andean Group. 
As was to be expected, the reforms introduced by 
the Quito Protocol soon ran up against the problems 
created by managed trade, centering especially on the 
so-called "sensitive" products, which were precisely 
those that had been the most dynamic items in the 
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intraregional trade of some of the member countries. 
Several other important issues remained to be 
resolved, such as the definitions concerning existing 
industrial programmes, but they were being worked 
on. It was obvious, however, that some way had to be 
found to get round the problems presented by 
managed trade and continue to make progress. The 
Board of the Agreement had proposed ending that 
system, and once again a conflictive situation was 
created, thereby slowing down the process. 
High-ranking officials of the five countries21 met 
in May 1989 in Cartagena de Indias in accordance 
with the commitment they had made in Caracas, at 
the inauguration ceremony of Carlos Andrés Pérez, 
to meet on a regular basis (twice a year). In 
Cartagena, the officials set themselves the task of 
studying the means of promoting economic integra-
tion, which was clearly going through a difficult 
period despite the recent reforms. The document 
containing this consensus was named the Manifesto 
of Cartagena de Indias. ït is an interesting 
document, devoted almost entirely to finding ways to 
reactivate integration. Its basic points are: 
i) to organize a follow-up system with the 
participation of the highest authorities of the 
respective countries.23 This task was given to 
the periodical meeting of Presidents, with the 
support of the Council of Foreign Ministers of 
the Andean Group, which became the organ of 
the agreement; 
ii) to stimulate the reactivation of Andean integra-
tion. Apart from the mention of concrete 
measures,24 the Andean Council of Foreign 
Ministers was asked to present to the next 
meeting of the Presidents a strategic design for 
the orientation of the Group which would have 
comprehensive coverage and would include 
short-, medium-, and long-term actions for 
strengthening subregional integration; 
Four Presidents and lhe Minister of Foreign Relations of 
Bolivia. 
2 2
 It was the 20th anniversary of the Cartagena Agreement, 
signed In the same city where this summit meeting was being held. 
2 3
 Manifesto of Cartagena de Indias, Board, of the Cartagena 
Agreement JUN/ di 1237, 29 May 1989. 
24
 For example, revise and adjust the current minimum 
common external tariff in order to adapt it to the present 
needs of the subregion, and other similar actions 
iii) to give the Andean process a more 
comprehensive and less "commercial" character; 
several foreign-policy initiatives were 
specifically mentioned in this respect. 
It seems likely that these elements of the 
Declaration will have a decisive influence in the life 
of the process. The strategic design was in fact 
presented at the next meeting of Presidents (in the 
Galápagos Islands), with the effects that will be 
described below. 
The organization for follow-up and co-ordination 
did serious work, as demonstrated by what happened 
at the following meetings of the Presidents and the 
Andean Council. There are signs of an effort to 
expand the areas of action and deal with non-
economic activities also of interest for the process, 
some of which had been practically abandoned, (for 
example, labour issues). 
By the time the second Summit Meeting of 
Andean Presidents was held (Galápagos Islands, 
17-18 December 1989), six months after the 
Cartagena meeting, the third meeting of Presidents of 
the Group of Eight had already taken place (October 
1989), and the meeting of Ministers of the group had 
issued the Buenos Aires Declaration only a few days 
before. The spirit of these two meetings and their 
insistence on prompt action no doubt influenced the 
Galápagos meeting, while what happened in lea must 
have also influenced the work done by the Board of 
the Cartagena Agreement in preparing the draft 
strategic design requested by the Andean Presidents, 
which was presented at the Galápagos meeting. The 
result, for anyone familiar with the way of life of the 
Cartagena Agreement, was completely surprising and 
disconcerting. 
Thus, at the Galápagos meeting, the Andean 
Presidents approved a programme of short-, medium-, 
and long-term action for the Andean Group, 
covering items ranging from trade up to joint foreign 
relations and including all the areas of economic 
integration activity covered by the Cartagena 
Agreement. They did so almost without amending 
the draft prepared by the Board of the Agreement. 
These decisions radically changed the pace of action 
called for in the 1987 Quito Protocol, and the Andean 
process was now committed to a programme of 
substantial acceleration, especially with respect to 
trade, which was the area that had received the most 
attention and up till then had been the most 
conflictive. 
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In its "Galápagos Declaration: The Andean 
Commitment to Peace, Security and Co-operation", 
the summit meeting of Andean Presidents, decided, 
inter alia: 
i) to achieve customs union by 1995 on the part of 
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, and by 1999 on 
the part of Bolivia and Ecuador; these last two 
countries will have to complete the liberalization 
programme by 1995 and adopt, the common 
external tariff by 1999, beginning this process in 
1992; 
ii) to reduce by 80% in 1990, the reserve list for 
industrial programming (already carried out), and 
do away with the list of exceptions (except for a 
residue) between 1991 and 1992 for the large 
countries, and between 1995 and 1997 for 
Bolivia and Ecuador. These two measures mean 
a considerable extension of the liberalization 
programme; 
iii) the above-mentioned radical reduction of the 
reserve list means in practice eliminating 
industrial programming as the mechanism 
designed to guarantee the equity of the process, 
thus completing the process of rejection of that 
mechanism which had begun with the Quito 
Protocol; 
iv) to substantially reduce the Common Minimum 
External Tariff during the first quarter of 1990. 
This reduction has been made, and the highest 
nominal level of this tariff is now 50%, whereas 
before it was approximately 80%; 
v) to eliminate by 1991 the system of managed trade 
created by the Quito Protocol, which was 
scheduled to last, with intermediate reductions, 
up to 1997. 
The Strategic Design contains many other 
measures, including commitments to harmonize 
policies, but the above are the most important and 
immediate decisions. What they involve is, firstly, to 
define the objective precisely, establish a customs 
union, and substantially accelerate the process for 
putting it into effect. In the Quito Protocol, the 
objective was not defined, there was no deadline for 
the adoption of the Common External Tariff, and 
even the improvement of the liberalization 
programme depended on an evaluation of Bolivia's 
and Ecuador's situation within the agreement. 
Secondly, these changes convert the Cartagena 
Agreement de jure and de facto into a classical trade 
integration scheme. There is virtually no provision for 
any mechanism to supplement or correct in certain 
sectors the functioning of the market. The industrial 
programme of the Agreement could not reach its 
goals for several reasons, but now what remains of 
that programme is functionally innocuous. 
As we can see, there is a profound difference 
between this attitude towards integration and the very 
concept of economic policy behind it on the one 
hand, and the attitudes that were prevailing when the 
Agreement was signed, or even those that still existed 
only two years ago, when the Quito Protocol was 
adopted. The changes in ALADI and those observed 
in the integration between Argentina and Brazil point 
in the same direction. The governments involved are 
obviously affected by the circumstances and concerns 
summed up in section V of this article, which 
characterize what we called the second phase in this 
stage of integration in Latin America. If political life 
had been more normal in Central America, something 
similar probably would have taken place there, in line 
of course with the special characteristics of that 
sub-region. This is only a conjecture, but it has its 
grounds in the concern that Central America too must 
be linked to the international economy. 
The manifestations of this flood-tide of openness 
are more and more frequent, so its expression in 
economic integration should be seen more as a 
derivative -a special case- of a broader attitude 
which is attempting at the very least to move the 
centre of gravity of development policy towards the 
world market. The reforms in their external trade 
policies recently adopted by some Latin American 
countries have that intention, and it is a fact that 
protection against the rest of the world has diminished 
substantially. It may be said in those cases that, 
chronologically, trade with third parties was 
liberalized first, so that what has taken place with 
regional integration is only an extension of what was 
happening in general with foreign trade. Thus, 
Bolivia, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela drastically 
reduced the protection applied in their domestic 
markets well before the initiatives for regional 
openness described above took shape. We have not 
mentioned Chile, whose liberalization process goes 
back to the 1970s, but Bolivia, for example, opened 
See the references to the attitude of the business sectors 
in Costa Rica and other Central American countries in Alfredo 
Guerra-Borges, Desarrollo e integración en Centroamérka: del 
pasado a las perspectivas, Mexico City, CRIES-IIEC, Ediciones 
de Cultura Popular, 1988, p. 99. 
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its economy in 1985 as part of an anti-inflation 
policy, and this policy of openness has remained 
practically untouched since that time. In Central 
America, even though the rules of the Common 
Market have not changed formally, Costa Rica 
recently inaugurated a policy of comprehensive 
liberalization, and the other countries will probably 
have to do the same once conditions allow the nego-
tiation of a reform in Central American integration. 
At least for the countries mentioned, these facts 
bear out the previous affirmation about the apparently 
subsidiary nature of the present emphasis on 
accelerating the trade element of economic integra-
tion. This conjecture is strengthened when one thinks 
of what has happened with those integration 
instruments that are different from the classical forms 
of trade integration, i.e., according to the case, 
liberalization or preferential tariff programmes and a 
common external tariff. In contrast with the decided 
support for openness that has been prevalent in recent 
initiatives with respect to these instruments, there has 
been no significant progress in other fields (some of 
them critically important), such as systems for settling 
payments and balance-of-payments support. 
This might, at all events, be too hasty a 
judgment, since there may be different and equally 
intense motivations for comprehensive openness and 
for regional openness. In that case, however, there 
should be a clear concept of the functions that each 
one would have to fulfill in the new development 
model, with the corresponding delimitation of spheres 
and the consequent discrimination of policies. 
Judging from the decisions made up to the present, 
there are no indications that the measures taken 
correspond to a strategic concept of the objectives 
that regional integration should accomplish within a 
model of comprehensive openness. This is a serious 
concern that, so far, the facts have not yet put to rest. 
The question is important, not only because some 
of the countries that have already begun these reforms 
are the heavyweights of regional trade, but also 
because practically all of the Latin American 
countries seem to be heading in the same direction. 
Colombia has already substantially changed its 
system of foreign trade, including its methods of 
protection (tariff and non-tariff), while Ecuador has 
begun to reform its tariffs and its foreign-trade 
policies. That will also probably be the option of 
countries like Brazil, which has in fact already begun 
to open up its economy: a process it will very likely 
intensify as soon as it finishes its "shock treatment". 
Peru's new government will most probably follow the 
same path. Information on Central America and the 
Caribbean is not available, but a similar inclination 
is predictable. 
Apart from governments' sincere conviction 
-which they undoubtedly hold- that a policy change 
along these lines is genuinely needed, a realistic 
appreciation of the forces pushing for a policy reform 
is important for our view of the future. Decisive 
among these forces is the pressure of the multilateral 
credit agencies, which have almost arbitrary power in 
renegotiations of the external debt and consider 
structural adjustment of the economy to be a prior 
condition for this. Structural adjustment means 
profoundly changing key macroeconomic policies 
regarding exchange rates, interest rates, tariffs and 
other instruments for regulating foreign trade, as well 
as modifications of legislation governing investment, 
apart from the policies for different productive 
sectors. The theories in vogue with respect to 
protection are well known: a low and uniform 
national tariff, to ensure a low effective protection 
with effects that are as neutral as possible on the 
different activities. A single equilibrium exchange 
rate is supposed to compensate for the tariff reduction 
and be the basic instrument of protection from then 
on. Its effectiveness should not be diminished or 
distorted by quantitative restrictions on imports, nor 
by incentives to invest in productive activities other 
than those needed to promote exports in order to 
compensate for the bias arising from the existence of 
an import tariff, if there is one. 
Recommendations on "structural adjustment" are 
naturally much more complex and contain elements 
that fit in with the conditions of each country. There 
is no need to go into detail about them here. We will 
only describe what we consider to be the essential 
nucleus of the recommended reform, which, as far as 
we know, effectively tends to be substantially the 
same in all the countries. That nucleus, together with 
the suggestion for overall deregulation, constitutes the 
basic direction of the changes that our countries are 
beginning to make in their foreign-trade systems and 
policies. By way of example, we may take the case of 
one of them, Venezuela, which has made changes 
characteristic of this new trade policy and which 
demonstrates better than the other countries the 
objectives being pursued, since it is further along the 
road to reform. The change is directed, for the 
26
 Decree No. 239 of 24 May 1989, providing for a New 
Integral Economic Strategy, Gaceta Oficial, No. 34230, 30 
May 1989. 
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moment, at the manufacturing sector, and will 
consist in the adjustment of tariffs and the progressive 
elimination of non-tariff restrictions (article 2). By 
June 1989 the reduction of the ad valorem tariff 
should leave it at a maximum of 80% for 
consumer goods and 50% for intermediate and capital 
goods and raw materials (article 5), as a measure of 
transitory protection, to be reduced in time. That 
measure has already been adopted. With two 
intermediate steps, the objective of the tariff reform 
is scheduled to be achieved in 1993, when the 
maximum tariff will be 20%, with only two tariff 
levels (article 9). At the same time, as from 1989, all 
non-tariff restrictions on imports and tax exemptions 
on imports of manufactured goods will be 
progressively dismantled. Article 12 even establishes 
the commitment to move toward eliminating public 
and private import monopolies, in addition to the 
deregulation of exports referred to in article 17, 
and the creation of an export subsidy linked to the 
In the present situation, with its inclination -which 
seems to be spreading- towards uncompromising 
openness to the world economy, at the same time that 
a recessive adjustment process persists in almost all 
Latin American countries, the future of regional 
integration is extremely uncertain, even though it is 
true that a series of sudden decisions have been 
taken which seek to reactivate that integration, and 
that this is undoubtedly the will of the governments 
involved. 
It might be asked, however, if such reactivation 
or relaunching is really feasible in the context of trade 
liberalization with third parties, as already discussed. 
That is a prior and unavoidable question, which, if 
answered in the affirmative, still leaves intact other 
concerns about the kind of integration that would be 
best for Latin America in the present circumstances of 
the international economy, the region's need to be 
linked to the more dynamic currents of that economy, 
and the financial constraints in which the region 
would presumably have to develop in the foreseeable 
future. 
level of import tariffs, by anticipating the lowering of 
this subsidy as tariff reform advances (article 18). 
This undoubtedly important change, it is 
worth mentioning, was adopted before the decisions 
of the lea meeting of the Group of Eight that 
sought to revitalize ALADI, and before the 
Galapagos summit, which tried to do the same for 
the Andean Group. The spirit of openness evident 
in Venezuela's Decree No. 239 preceded considera-
tion of integration issues, so we can say that the latter 
derived from the former. This conclusion becomes 
evident as soon as we read the text of article 13 of the 
Decree in question, where it says that the National 
Executive will negotiate Venezuela's commitments 
under the Andean Pact and other international 
agreements in line with the provisions of this decree. 
It is clear, however, that commitments as'precise as a 
maximum tariff level of 20% by 1993 are more a 
negotiating position than material for later 
renegotiation. 
The nature of this article demands that we 
generalize and refer to Latin America as a whole. 
That abstraction conceals the consequences of the 
diversity of the national economies and prevents us 
from arriving at specific conclusions. We hope, in any 
case, that the conclusions of this article will be 
pertinent and will allow whoever so desires to 
examine them in the light of national realities. 
The first question implies a more general query: 
can indiscriminate openness to the international 
economy be reconciled with regional integration? In 
customs union theory, the question was usually posed 
as a dilemma, that is, presented as two mutually 
exclusive options. In the eyes of that theory, free 
trade was more beneficial than regional integration, 
which was only acceptable as a step towards free 
trade, if it served as a net creator of trade. The 
consideration of other benefits, among them the 
possibility of increasing exports as a result of regional 
liberalization and the dynamic effects of a greater 
interest in development, gave more arguments, 
however, for justifying the inherent attraction of 
VII 
Desirable and feasible levels of regional integration 
in the context of openness 
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regional integration. Finally, opting for regional 
integration meant giving preference to liberalizing 
trade within the integration zone rather than opting 
for unilateral, non-reciprocal liberalization with 
respect to the whole world. They were clearly 
mutually exclusive options, even if integration were 
understood as a temporary state which would make it 
possible to increase exports and develop comparative 
advantages in order to later compete dynamically in 
the international economy. 
At least a priori, it does not seem that the Latin 
American countries have opted for a form of regional 
integration that excludes the comprehensive 
liberalization of trade. The two processes have 
progressed together, and in reality, the expressions of 
openness preceded the most recent decisions to 
reactivate integration. We have to suppose, however, 
that when it comes to intensifying the processes, an 
option for one or the other will have to be made early 
on, and logically, we should expect that that option 
would be in favour of regional integration, while 
continuing to open up trade within pre-established 
limits. It could even be accepted that this option 
might be of limited duration, lasting up to the time 
when a desired level of development (for all or some 
activities) was achieved, in order to later open up 
more to international competition. In any case, the 
immediate effects are interesting for our question, 
and in those effects regional integration would have 
to predominate over greater openness. 
Under these conditions, the two processes would 
be reconcilable in either of the following situations: 
a) comprehensive openness only up to a level that 
allows for discrimination (also comprehensive) in 
favour of the countries belonging to the integration 
area; and b) selective opening-up to the whole world 
for certain activities, which would allow for the 
functioning of a form of regional integration (also 
selective) for all those activities not included in the 
comprehensive openness. 
Judging from the character of the liberalizing 
reform s adopted up till now, the predom inant 
direction would be comprehensive openness, with 
minor exceptions for a minimum of activities (for 
example, the motor industry in Venezuela, Colombia 
and Ecuador). Moreover, the position of the United 
States Government, the World Bank and the IMF is 
precisely in favour of comprehensive openness, and 
this is what characterizes the policy reform 
commitments undertaken with them by several 
Latin American countries, with certain specific 
concessions. We will return to this aspect when we 
speak of the kind of regional integration that would 
be best for Latin America in the present situation. For 
now, it is sufficient to note that the reform is moving 
towards comprehensive openness, so that we can see 
the possibility that the situation described in 
point a) above will take place. It would exist if study 
of the characteristics of openness shows that there is 
room for discriminating sufficiently in favour of 
regional markets. In the usual terms of Latin 
American integration, that is the equivalent of posing 
the problem of the so-called regional margin of 
preference and evaluating its adequacy with respect 
to the liberalization policies in vogue. 
Obviously, in the current situation it is 
impossible to rigorously evaluate the existing or 
proposed preference for regional production. The 
reform of foreign-trade policies is presumably still 
underway in all of the countries, and even if it has 
been completed somewhere, the local circumstances 
vary so much from country to country that we would 
need far more information and macroeconomic 
evaluations than it would be possible to handle within 
the limits of this article. We can only conjecture about 
where current trends towards openness could lead, 
using our personal experiences as a basis for 
venturing an opinion, which can only be an 
expression of concern or preoccupation about the 
evolution of policies that, at least superficially, do not 
seem to correspond in most cases to well-thought-out 
plans for development. 
Even with these reservations, a judgment about 
the adequacy of a margin of preference requires a 
prior comment about the instrument or instruments 
which would most probably have to be used to 
discriminate in favour of regional production. Our 
view is that this instrument should be the import 
tariff, not only because regional integration has 
primarily used tariff concessions or liberalization 
(even occasionally common external tariffs) to 
promote trade, but also because the very direction of 
the reform of foreign-trade policies makes tariffs the 
only instrument possible -even though in a very 
limited and uniform way or with rather limited 
discrimination- for protecting the domestic market 
over and above the basic protection given by the 
exchange rate. In theory there are several instruments 
other than tariffs which could be useful for 
discriminating in favour of regional integration, and 
they could possibly be developed in the future, but 
experience so far in their use is rather negative. 
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Regional integration policies have failed in their 
handling of direct-allocation instruments, such as 
industrial programming, and even in the little-used 
complementarity agreements the central mechanism 
used has been tariffe. Such policies have been unable 
to mobilize State purchases, even in the case of the 
selective integration between Argentina and Brazil. 
For this same reason, regional trade integration in 
Latin America basically uses tariffe to allocate a 
margin of preference for regional production. With 
respect to the reform of general foreign trade policies, 
we should remember that the essential components of 
the reform include the elimination of non-tariff 
restrictions and the limitation or elimination of other 
means that could sidetrack the market signals, such as 
State purchases (State monopolies, State-owned 
enterprises, etc.). 
In practice, and if there are no unforeseen 
changes, the tariffs remain the only instrument 
capable of giving a margin of preference to regional 
or subregional production. If we go by the known 
goals of the reforms promoted by the multilateral 
agencies, which are similar in all countries 
-maximum tariffs of 20%, with only two tariff 
levels- the conclusion is that for many activities 
(especially those that involve a certain technological 
complexity) the possible margin of preference, given 
the instruments in use, would not be sufficient. This is 
evident almost a priori in the case of ALADI's 
concessions, where the norm 27 is a reduction of 
tariffs, not total liberation. And that is true both for 
limited and regional agreements. There could be 
some doubt in the case of goods that are totally 
liberated in intraregional trade -for example, those 
already duty-free in the Andean Group- but even 
there, in the majority of the countries the list of 
products that would be interesting to develop but for 
which the margin of preference is insufficient is quite 
long. Naturally, those who would suffer the most 
from that situation would be the less developed 
countries, since this would make trade integration 
even more inequitable, with all the consequent 
problems for its future stability. 
The formal exception consists of the concessions made in 
the list of market openings for the relatively less developed 
countries, in which imports are exempted from duty. 
^Recall our previous remarks about the tightness of the 
margin in lhe case of the basic regional preference of 20%; 
if the level of the external tariff were 20%, the regional preference 
would only be 4%. 
Despite the fact that we are at the beginning 
of a period of change, experience shows what could 
happen: after evaluating the Protocol on Capital 
Goods between Argentina and Brazil, Porta and 
Fontanals indicate that the tendency to open up 
to third parties has already created a contradictory 
scenario, since on the one hand there are attempts to 
open up markets, even giving priority to the 
indiscriminate liberalization of imports in the capital-
goods sector, while on the other hand the margin 
of preference for complementarity becomes uncertain 
and tends to be even less. This has helped, as 
the authors point out, to prevent integration from 
having had dynamic effects on that sector in 
Argentina. 
The same concern exists, and very strongly too, 
in the case of the other integration efforts, and 
thought is being given (rather unrealistically, in our 
judgment) to mechanisms which could make up for 
the lack of a margin of tariff preference: for example, 
provision of financing for the buyer has been 
mentioned.30 
It should be pointed out that most products would 
not need high tariffs against third countries in order 
to achieve the desired effect. Transportation costs can 
in some cases be an effective barrier which hardly 
needs to be complemented by a tariff. There are other 
circumstances, however, which demand (even though 
temporarily) tariffs of a certain level and the support 
of other instruments which the countries must learn 
how to use: such is the case, for example, for certain 
nationally-produced capital goods that meet with 
resistance because their origins or brands are little 
known. Here, joint action between producers, major 
users and governments is to be recommended. In this 
and other cases, however, a margin of tariff 
preference is still a useful and frequently 
indispensable instrument, as shown by the experience 
mentioned above. 
Porta and Fontanals, op. cit., p. 24. 
30 
See David Moctesuma, "Integración económica, deuda 
externa y perspectivas para los años noventa", Report of the 
Seminar on Economic and Social Integration: Perspectives for 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s, Mexico City, 
Society for International Development (SID), September, 
1989, p. 81. 
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Recent events raise the spectre of even more 
adverse circumstances: negative margins for 
intraregional trade. Trade arrangements with the 
United States and other industrial countries, which 
ignore the most-favoured-nation clause stipulated by 
all the instruments of regional integration, and even 
more seriously, the linking of certain Latin American 
countries with the United States and other 
industrialized countries in free-trade areas -linkages 
which imply ignoring the most-favoured-nation 
clause of regional agreements- would extend a 
situation of negative margins that leaves no other 
solution for the countries involved than to openly opt 
for one or other system of preferential trade. 
The conclusion of this summary reflection would 
appear to be that if these trends in economic policy 
remain and spread, there will be no room for a 
regional economic integration process of any 
significance. That does not exclude the possibility 
that political and even economic co-operation in 
concrete projects and initiatives could continue and 
even grow stronger. But without a margin of 
significant preference it would be useless to propose 
the integration of markets, and much less of 
production. There is no doubt, however, that the Latin 
American countries have in recent years once again 
shown a real willingness to reactivate and accelerate 
regional integration. In spite of the contradictions 
brought on by the need to find a different centre of 
gravity for their economic policies, that will for union 
has been expressed in the series of recent initiatives 
described above. We should, therefore, radically 
change the direction of our analysis and, instead of 
asking what kind of regional integration would be 
compatible with openness to the exterior, we should 
try to find out directly what are the characteristics of 
the openness to the exterior that could be compatible 
with the regional integration that Latin America needs 
for ils development. The answer to this question 
would allow us to spell out the conditions needed in 
order for such openness to be compatible with an 
authentic and dynamic form of regional integration. 
In reality, this is the logical sequence for reconciling 
the options facing the region today. 
Basically this refers to the difficulties at the last meeting of 
the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of ALADI in 
achieving unanimous approval for (he Protocol for Deepening lhe 
Regional Tariff Preference. 
32
 That is to say, a tariff preference even greater for third 
parties than that given to countries of the region. 
As we mentioned above, there are at least three 
elements that must be taken into account in order to 
define the form or kind of viable integration that 
Latin America needs. 
The first element is the present international 
economy and its circumstances. We hardly need to 
insist that the great force for change behind the 
competition prevailing in the world today is the 
extraordinarily dynamic process of technological 
innovation. As happened in the case of the great 
technological changes of the past, but even more 
markedly now, the truth is that he who possesses and 
exercises the capacity to innovate is in a position to 
take control of the most dynamic functions of 
international specialization. The gap between rich 
countries and developing nations is now basically a 
question of knowledge, and this is probably the 
hardest to overcome. In the graphic words of David 
Landes, capital is not the main problem. Theoretical 
knowledge and know-how are increasingly esoteric 
and obscure, and hence more difficult to acquire. 
The potential advantage that latecomers traditionally 
had is becoming increasingly problematical, because 
the costs of crossing the technological threshold are 
now very high. For that reason, it is vital that Latin 
America should do everything it can to close the 
technology gap without delay and not fall further 
behind. 
There are other phenomena in the international 
economy which are also important, especially the 
internationalization of capital and certain services, but 
the technological gap is one of the most crucial and is 
also the ultimate justification for opening up to the 
exterior. 
The second element concerns the wave of 
liberalization of foreign trade (and other external 
transactions) now prevalent in our economies. We 
have already mentioned that this liberalization 
responds to the growing conviction that the 
development model needs to be changed to make 
exports the motor of economic growth. Openness can 
stimulate exports and is an incentive for greater 
efficiency in existing activities, but if we want to put 
our development on a firmer basis we must obviously 
modify the structure of exports by gradually 
incorporating more products with a high component 
•" Richard T. Ely, Lecture, "Why are we so rich and they 
so poor", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 
vol. 80, No. 2, May 1990, p. 9. 
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of knowledge, be they primary or industrial goods or 
services. In other words, our present productive base 
is unable to take full advantage of an open economy. 
The only export structure that can lay the foundations 
for stable progress is one based on the new conditions 
of technology. In terms which have now become 
common, openness is justified to the extent that it 
allows for the development of dynamic comparative 
advantages in a world whose forthcoming evolution 
will depend on technological innovation. 
It is a fact, however, that theoretical knowledge, 
technical skills, know-how and innovative capacity 
are all manifestations of a social quality -scientific 
and technological progress- which is impossible to 
assimilate or incorporate through openness alone. As 
Landes said, it is obscure and elusive. Openness may 
help to foment competition and create a more 
propitious atmosphere for knowledge and contact 
with the outside world, and even for foreign 
investment, but the final results will depend much 
more on a complicated set of national policies in the 
fields of science and technology, education, 
production, etc., to say nothing of social motivations, 
which are by their nature even more elusive. 
It is precisely in such a decisive area of national 
policy, involving high costs of innovation and 
difficulties in learning and disseminating technology, 
that regional integration could be most useful, 
especially if combined with an openness that breaks 
with the status quo, ECLAC treats this issue in its 
recent report entitled Changing Production Patterns 
with Social Equity, calling it the "symbiosis between 
external and regional demand". 
If this is so, then that combination should be 
carefully studied, establishing the content of the 
regional integration effort and reserving areas that 
would not be included in the overall liberalization 
process, or at least would not be included on the same 
lines as the rest of the activities. That means 
discrimination with respect to third parties and 
inevitably "protection", in order to induce an action in 
an area where there are obvious disadvantages in 
comparison with the outside world. 
An itlempt should be made to promote the gradual 
improvement of comparative advantages in those sectors where 
technological development and learning are facilitated by 
regional action". ECLAC, Changing Production Patterns with 
Social Equity (LC/O.1601-P), United Nations publication, 
Sales No. E90.II.G.6. Santiago, Chile, March 1990, p. 1 & 
In this case, the content of integration 
programmes is probably much more important than 
the efficiency of the instruments of discrimination, 
among which, in theory, tariff preferences would not 
be the most efficient. Nevertheless, for reasons 
already given, these preferences have been the only 
valid instrument so far. If more suitable instruments 
can be found, so much the better, but for the time 
being, even for reasons functional to the liberalization 
processes, a preference that would give a clear 
stimulus has to be maintained. 
The third element that has to be taken into 
account in order to move towards viable integration is 
the climate of persistent financial constraint and 
instability caused by the external debt crisis, the 
adjustment policies, and our own past and present 
errors. A recent analysis examined the effects of 
this extreme situation on integration. The 
consequences were devastating in the first years of 
the crisis (1983-1986), and in spite of the 
accommodation which has taken place with the 
passage of time, regional trade is still affected and is 
still below its 1980-1981 figures. Unless we solve the 
debt problem and recover adequate external 
financing, the immediate future looks equally 
foreboding. 
What kind of regional integration could best 
weather the storm and contribute more positively to 
the future of Latin America in this period of 
constraints and liberalization? There are obvious 
priorities which have not been implemented: for 
example, strengthening the systems for settling 
payments and for balance-of-payments support. With 
regard to intraregional trade, the crisis has meant in 
fact that one kind of selective unilateral liberalization 
has predominated. This kind of liberalization has now 
been moderated, but has still not disappeared. This is 
seen by the treatment given to key products. 
Despite that, as we have seen, all the schemes 
have included substantial reforms to accelerate and 
broaden regional liberalization, and moreover a 
process of comprehensive external openness has been 
initiated whictflooks as though it will be profound in 
its effects. 
Victor Urquidi and Javier Villanueva (eds.), "Integración 
latinoamericana: problemas de hoy y nuevos rumbos", Crisis y 
crecimiento en América Latina, Buenos Aires, Raúl Prebisch 
Foundation, Editorial Tesis S.A., 1989, pp. 321-370. 
It should be noted that the choice of existing activities, 
perhaps the least efficient, was purely defensive. 
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It would be interesting to know what could 
happen with regional integration. If the reforms 
substantially expand intraregional trade, at least some 
of the stagnation of priority productive sectors will 
have been offset and we would be better able to take 
advantage of the opening to the exterior. We fear, 
however, that the serious disequilibria in intraregional 
trade will persist and that this will lead once again 
to paralysis. This would be much more likely if 
liberalization with third parties leads to balance-
of-payments problems, which is probable at least in 
the medium term. The danger points would, of 
course, be the weaker countries, because the 
integration systems have now become more 
inequitable than before. 
These concerns lead to a question worth 
exploring. Would this not be a good time to study 
certain programmes on which regional integration 
could be selectively concentrated, while continuing as 
far as possible with the reactivation now being 
initiated? Obviously, the priority issues would be 
indicated, at least partially, by the need for changing 
production patterns. 
With these comments on the three elements, we 
can finally give a summary opinion on the thrust that 
should be given to regional integration in these 
difficult times when it is exposed to so many 
contradictions and, at the same time, so essential for 
the future. As we have already stated, we must 
necessarily speak in general terms and not refer to 
any particular effort. 
For various reasons, selective integration would 
be easier to reconcile with the general trend towards 
openness, and more importantly, could better serve 
the development needs of the region. Existing 
integration schemes need not be formally modified, 
but efforts should be made to maintain or establish in 
the selected areas a minimum of policies 
discriminating against third countries. 
In order to define the aspects of the integration 
processes which could most usefully be emphasized, 
two main objectives should be pointed out: 
a) The need to preserve and increase the most 
dynamic currents of intraregional trade; it would be 
an aberration if premature openness to third countries 
led to a contraction in intraregional trade and affected 
the lines of production with the most rapidly growing 
sales, especially if they involve scale effects and 
external economies, which indicate the existence of 
unusued potential; 
b) The need to stimulate the development of 
activities (production of goods and services) with a 
high knowledge content, as well as those of critical 
importance for furthering the change in production 
patterns. We have already stated our case in this 
regard; the only thing to add is that all the countries 
should be given the opportunity to participate in the 
structural change: the more advanced, through 
activities on the frontiers of technology;37 the less 
developed in this respect, through forms of 
production that do most to further the learning 
process and the dissemination of technology. 
Tariff preferences are indispensable as incentives 
for proper management in these areas. The margin of 
preference can be ensured by placing limits on 
comprehensive openness or by reducing regional 
tariffs. Especially for the areas chosen in function of 
point a) above, integration would have to undertake 
complex action and develop mechanisms for 
promotion which in the terms used some time ago by 
Professor Tinbergen, lead to the authentic integration 
of positive production, that is to say, not mechanisms 
based on merely removing obstacles. 
Clearly, the proper linking and co-ordinating of 
the processes of comprehensive and regional 
openness is not a job that can be improvised. Difficult 
strategy definitions need to be studied and political 
decisions have to be negotiated. If the countries, 
integration agencies, the Latin American Economic 
System (SELA) and ECLAC itself do not 
immediately take up this task, it will be too late and 
an opportunity will be lost which may not present 
itself again for generations to come. 
Moreover, a preoccupation still exists which the 
facts have not yet been able to pu to rest: at the 
moment of truth, will all or most Latin American 
countries still have the political will to keep open a 
field for significant regional integration? We have 
presupposed an affirmative answer in this article, 
but only the future will tell if our assumption was 
right. 
See Chudnovsky and Porta, op. cit., pp. 141-144. 
The relevant action tor technology is referred to 
in ECLAC, 1990, op. cit., especially chapter VI, section 2, 
pp. 164-170. 
